Aircraft Maintenance Technology

JAN-FEB 2017

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SAFET Y MATTERS 56 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2017 AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE TECHNOLOGY translated from Mandarin, there's no men- tion of the No. 1 engine being shut down in error. To further the point, the crew 'sound' calm and in control; there is no fighting or lack of situational awareness in the CVR-T transcript. Now to be fair, the first section of the report is called Findings as a Result of this Investigation; it lays out all the findings in three topics: powerplant, risk, and other findings. What it doesn't do is bring the reader to the end of the report; it's like a mystery's first chapter describing the crime and who did it. Furthermore, it's inaccurate and presumptuous; the investigator 'reads' the pilots' collective minds, knowing their thoughts during the harrowing last min- utes of flight. An accident report is supposed to flow from fact to fact to fact, building upon the narrative; the writer is meant to lay out the events, assuming that the readers don't know the chain of events … because they don't. In the Probable Cause section of the Executive Summary, the ninth probable cause states, 'An intermittent signal dis- continuity between the autofeather unit No. 2 and the torque sensor may have caused … No. 2 autofeathering.' May have? I never worked the ATR so as I understand it there are two probabilities: One — the automatic takeoff power control system (ATCPS) became unarmed during takeoff roll; and, two — the ATCPS being activated during climb. This is an assumption — not based in fact (may have) — and a leap. This statement is found on page three of the Executive Summary; I cannot reconcile how the assumption was drawn. Again, it may be due to translation, but a confusing aspect of the report fails to estab- lish who's who. The acronym 'PF' means the 'pilot flying', yet never defines which pilot is flying the leg or if the left-seater becomes the PF in the emergency. One pilot is referred to as 'Captain A', instead of Captain or First Officer; this may be a cultural misinterpretation on my part, but it doesn't contribute to understanding the events. Finally, the report mentions a probable cause that the crew ignored standard operating procedures for engine flameout, while also stating the airline's training and procedures were inadequate. Again, per- haps cultural, but are they holding the crew accountable for what they aren't provided? I know a lot of hard work went into this report; I also don't know the efforts required to translate the report into English. Unfortunately for me, it raised more questions than answers. AviationPros.com/company/10134601 AviationPros.com/company/10134757 NEW Version Now Available For Bombardier Global Series • Exceeds OSHA & Military Standards • Triple Safety Redundant Features • Bank Vault Style Door Latch • Services 35" Tires • Laminated Steel Construction • Durable Powdercoat Finish Online Test Videos! • Low profile allows single person use • Lock bolt site holes with attached flashlight make alignment easy • Includes socket, flashlight and rigid, no- flex breaker bar head • For G5/G550/G650 TIRE INFLATION CAGE TOOLS & EQUIPMENT DESIGNED BY MECHANICS FOR MECHANICS GULFSTREAM SPANNER SOCKET Manufacturer of select tooling and GSE www.AlberthAviation.com 832-934-0055 GSE | Tooling | Aircraft Parts AviationPros.com/company/10016971 RESOURCE GUIDES

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